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The Dutch system of employment protection is often perceived as too strict for workers on permanent 
contracts, because of the large procedural inconveniences, difficulty of dismissal and high severance pay. It is 
suggested that the system of employment protection lowers labour market flexibility by lowering hiring and 
firing rates, and increasing the employers’ labour costs. Many parties (e.g. government, employers and trade 
unions) have opted for reforms of the system in recent years. One of the proposed scenarios is to allow for 
more differentiation by decentralising employment protection, e.g. regulations in individual or collective labour 
agreements. At present, however, it is already possible to regulate employment protection on a decentralised 
level, i.e. in collective labour agreements on a sector or company level. Dutch national labour law is only ¾ 
binding, implying that deviations are allowed for in collective labour agreements. Yet, most research on 
employment protection is on the national provisions and disregards this sector level differentiation. With this 
study we contribute to the literature by investigating employment protection provisions on a sector level.  
 
The level of employment protection on the sector level not only depends on the national level of employment 
protection, the system of unemployment insurance, but also of union power and collective bargaining 
strategies pursued by the trade unions. Employment protection provisions might be used as a trading good in 
collective bargaining, i.e. there might be a trade off with other provisions such as bargained wage development 
or extra-statutory unemployment insurance. This might lead to sector differences in the level of employment 
protection found in collective labour agreements. In addition, employment protection affects labour market 
performance. Hiring and firing rates are expected to be lower at higher levels of employment protection, and 
the use of temporary contracts as an alternative to regular workers is expected to be higher. To analyse the 
collective labour agreements, we use the FNV CLA databank and for the analysis of labour market dynamics, 
we use the online databank of Statistics Netherlands.  
 
Our study shows that sector level provisions on employment protection are at or above the national level, 
which is related to union density. The higher levels of employment protection seem to come at a cost for 
employers who have higher labour costs, both non-wage and wage costs. Consequently, hiring and firing are 
indeed lower at higher levels of employment protection. The use of temporary contracts, however, is not 
higher at higher levels of employment protection, but the opposite is observed. These findings can have 
important policy implications, especially with respect to the debate in shifting responsibilities, in general but 
particularly with respect to employment protection regulation, to the sector level. 
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 Employment protection in Dutch CLAs 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently the debate on employment protection in the Netherlands was raised again. First with the 
awaited (and abandoned) advise of the Social and Economic Council (SER) and now in light of the 
upcoming ‘Participatietop’, negotiations between the employers’ organisations and trade unions on 
labour participation issues. The Dutch system of employment protection is perceived as too strict 
for workers on permanent contracts, because of the large procedural inconveniences, difficulty of 
dismissal and high severance pay. The system is believed to exaggerate a dual market: one for the 
insiders (those with permanent contracts, mostly prime-aged men) who enjoy good employment 
protection and one for the outsiders (those with temporary contracts, mostly women and young 
workers) who enjoy less protection. In addition, it is suggested that the system of employment 
protection lowers labour market flexibility, i.e. by lowering hiring and firing rates, increasing the 
share of temporary workers and increasing the employers’ labour costs (WRR, 2007a; 2007b). In 
recent years, many parties (e.g. government, employers’ organisations and trade unions) have opted 
for reforms. The employers are in favour of less employment protection to be able to adapt the 
workforce more quickly to changing economic circumstances. The trade unions favour the 
protection of workers against sudden dismissal and the negative income consequences associated 
with this.  
 
In a recent report of the Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Research (CPB) one of the 
recommended scenarios for reform is “[…] to allow for more differentiation and decentralisation of 
employment protection. In particular, responsibility with respect to setting the level of employment 
protection would be shifted to employers’ and trade unions. This could be done at the individual 
level but also via e.g. collective labour agreements” (Deelen et al., 2006: p.77). At present, however, 
it is already possible to regulate employment protection on a decentralised level, i.e. in collective 
labour agreements (CLAs) on a sector or company level. Dutch national labour law is only ¾ 
binding, implying that deviations (even those at the worker’s expense) are allowed for in CLAs. It is 
the responsibility of the social partners to negotiate on the employment protection provisions. 
Remarkably, most research on employment protection, as well as the debate, focuses on the 
national provisions. With this study we contribute to the literature by investigating employment 
protection provisions on a sector (or company) level. 
 
The following research questions are analysed both theoretically and empirically: To what extent are 
differences from national law found in CLAs and are there any differences between the sectors (e.g. 
reflecting different union power)? Are the provisions on employment protection related to other 
provisions in CLAs, such as wages or extra-statutory unemployment insurance (e.g. employment 
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protection as a trading good in collective bargaining)? Is the labour market performance in sectors 
with deviating employment protection legislation different from that in other sectors (e.g. inflow into 
unemployment, productivity, composition of labour force)?  
 
These questions are addressed successively in this paper. In section 2 we present the theoretical 
framework on employment protection, the relation with trade unions’ bargaining power, with other 
policy instruments such as unemployment insurance and with labour market performance. The main 
hypotheses to be tested are derived from this theoretical discussion. Next, in section 3, we 
elaborate on the methods used for the analysis. Sections 4 and 5 present the results, conveniently 
divided into two separate sections. We start with the results on our findings with respect to sector 
or company level provisions on employment protection and how these diverge between sectors. 
Next, we analyse how these findings relate to the trade unions’ bargaining power and the labour 
market performance in the various sectors. Finally, section 6 summarises and concludes. 
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2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND CLAS IN THEORY  
 
Rather than presenting a full theoretical discussion on the role of trade unions, collective bargaining 
and the labour market effects of employment protection, we briefly focus in this paper on the issues 
that are reflected in our empirical analysis.  
 
2.1 TRADE UNIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
 
Trade unions act as agents for individual workers and represent their interests on a sector and 
national level in the debate with employers and the government on labour market issues.1 They 
want to secure favourable wages and working conditions for the workers, including employment 
protection and income protection after involuntary dismissal (cf. Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Faith 
and Reid, 1987). Employers are generally willing to share their profits (in return for provisions in 
CLAs) to avoid industrial conflict, which might be more costly (cf. Booth, 1995). Union power is 
weaker in sectors where the non-unionised market is larger and non-union workers can ‘easily’ 
replace union workers. In the Netherlands, however, non-union workers are also covered by the 
CLAs, in two ways. First, when an employer is a negotiating partner for a specific CLA, the outcome 
applies to all his workers, regardless whether these are union members. Trade unions thus bargain 
for both union and non-union members (cf. Hartog, 1999). Second, the trade unions can file a 
request with the government to legally extend a sector level CLA to all workers in a specific sector, 
regardless whether their employer is a negotiating partner. Consequently, about 85 percent of 
Dutch workers is covered by a CLA and a ‘non-unionised’ worker market to replace ‘unionised’ 
workers is virtually non-existent. Union power to establish employment protection provisions, 
however, might still depend on union density. In sectors where union density is lowest, the position 
of trade unions is weaker compared to sectors where many workers are union members. A first 
hypothesis to be tested in our research is whether ‘provisions on workers’ employment protection are 
more common/higher in sectors where union density is highest’.  
 
Trade unions usually bargain on a set of provisions, including minimum wages or wage development, 
employment protection provisions and extra-statutory benefits after involuntary dismissal. Different 
provisions can be traded off against each other as part of the bargaining process. For example, in 
sectors where the probability of unemployment is smallest, the trade unions might be more eager to 
establish higher wages rather than employment protection. In addition, employment protection 
provisions and extra-statutory unemployment benefit can be used as substitutes in the bargaining 
                                                  
1 For an overview of Dutch industrial relations see Hartog (1999) and for an overview of trade union theory see Aidt and 
Tzannatos (2002). 
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process (cf. Addison and Teixeira, 2001; Blanchard and Tirole, 2004). This might also depend on the 
organisation and level of unemployment insurance. In the Netherlands, unemployment insurance is 
set by the government and the level is relatively generous with benefits ranging from 70 to 75 
percent of previous earnings. This could imply lower levels of employment protection in CLAs, 
when it holds that the two are substitutes, with the costs of dismissal being passed on to the state. 
Additionally, employers and trade unions might argue that there is no need for extra-statutory 
unemployment insurance in CLAs because of this generosity. Yet, trade unions might bargain such 
extra-statutory unemployment insurance in sectors with lower levels of employment protection. A 
second hypothesis to be tested is whether ‘Extra-statutory unemployment insurance is more 
common/higher in sectors with lower levels of employment protection’.  
 
Finally, employment protection provisions might be traded off against other CLA provisions, such as 
the negotiated wage. The theoretical effect of employment protection on wages, however, is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, when there already is a good level of employment protection, this can 
be used to negotiate ex post higher wages by the well-protected insiders (cf. Deelen et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, one could argue than when trade unions are in the bargaining process for higher 
levels of employment protection, this reduces the potential room for ex ante wage bargaining. 
Employment protection raises labour costs for the employer since he cannot costly fire less 
productive workers or adapt the workforce fast to a changing economic environment (cf. Addison 
and Teixeira, 2001). Consequently, a third hypothesis to be tested is whether ‘higher levels of 
employment protection reduce the scope for ex ante wage bargaining, i.e. negotiated wages in CLAs’. 
 
2.2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE  
 
Employment protection was originally designed as a means of insurance against income loss at times 
of dismissal. It facilitates the immediate search for a new job without excessive loss of income for 
the employee, because of a period of notice or severance pay. In addition, employment protection 
prevents a shift of the dismissal costs from the employer to society, after all the unemployed 
employee receives unemployment benefits in most countries. There are quite a number of 
theoretical studies on the expected effects of employment protection (see Deelen et al., 2006 for an 
overview). Many of the hypothesised effects, however, are ambiguous or depend on a large set of 
other variables (e.g. unemployment insurance, composition of labour force, economic businesscycle). 
One of the first and main effects expected from higher levels of employment protection is reduced 
labour market mobility, i.e. both firing and hiring are lower because of the higher firing costs applying 
to the employer (cf. Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). In the current debate on labour market flexibility, 
strict employment protection is viewed as one of the main hampering factors, especially in 
combination with generous unemployment insurance such as in the Netherlands. Consequently, a 
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hypothesis to be tested is whether ‘higher levels of employment protection reduce, ceteris paribus, firing 
and hiring rates’.  
 
As a consequence of employment protection provisions, the use of workers on temporary contracts 
is expected to rise. First, it is a way for employers to get around the rules of employment 
protection, which usually do not apply to workers on temporary contracts. In general, hiring 
temporary workers is less costly for the employer mainly because of the ease with which they can 
be dismissed. Second, such workers can be used by employers to adapt their workforce more 
quickly to a changing economic environment. The regular workers, or the insiders, cannot be used 
for this, since they cannot be dismissed easily during times of economic downturn. A second 
hypothesis to be tested is whether ‘higher levels of employment protection lead to a larger share of 
workers on temporary contracts’.   
 
Finally, as mentioned before, employment protection also affects labour costs. The relation, 
however, is not clear-cut. Ceteris paribus, labour costs are expected to increase due to the 
introduction of employment protection because of the higher costs of dismissal that have to be 
internalised by the firm. Yet, everything else is not held constant in practice. A rational employer 
would reduce the worker’s wage, i.e. shift the costs of employment protection to the worker, 
keeping labour costs equal. In addition, when it is true that employment protection lowers firing, or 
the inflow into unemployment, and the employers’ contributions to unemployment insurance 
depends on the unemployment rate, than the contributions can be lowered, ceteris paribus, 
lowering labour costs (cf. Blanchard and Tirole, 2004). Moreover, as argued before, the existence of 
employment protection can increase the scope for ex post wage bargaining, pushing up wages and 
labour costs. It is not sure which effect will be dominant, or if there is an effect on labour costs at 
all. Nevertheless, our final hypothesis is whether ‘higher levels of employment protection lead to higher 
labour costs’.  
AIAS-UvA            11 Trudie Schils       
12   AIAS-UvA 
 
 Employment protection in Dutch CLAs 
 
3 METHOD  
 
In 2005 about 750 CLAs existed in the Netherlands, covering about 85 percent of the employed 
labour force (SER, 2006). Just over one-fifth (23 percent) of these CLAs are sector agreements, 
covering 86 percent of the workers under CLA. The remaining CLAs are company CLAs. As 
mentioned before, the coverage of company or sector CLAs is extended to all workers working 
with an employer who is a partner in the CLA negotiations, regardless whether they are union 
members. In addition, sector CLAs can be extended to all workers within the sector, regardless 
whether the employer was a partner in the negotiations or whether the worker is a union member. 
This legal extension increases CLA coverage with about 10 percent (SER, 2006). 
 
The Federal Trade Union Confederation (FNV), the largest trade union confederation in the 
Netherlands, has set up a CLA databank in the early 1990s consisting of all CLAs of which the FNV 
was a negotiator, which is 92 percent (Schreuder and Tijdens, 2004). By the end of 2003, 983 
different CLAs are prevalent in the FNV Databank, including those that have expired. For the 
analysis in this paper, we used the actual text of 506 recent CLAs, all with a term ending after 
January 1, 2005. The overall coverage ratio of these CLAs is 74 percent (Table 3.1), which is not bad 
in comparison with a national coverage of 86 percent. Table 3.1 also shows that coverage of the 
CLAs in the dataset varies between the sectors and is lowest in commercial services (about 59 
percent) and highest in education (about 92 percent).  
 
Table 3.1: Coverage ratio of CLAs selected from the FNVs CLA databank.  




















Apart from the actual text of the CLA, the FNV also provides the user with other information, 
including the number of workers covered by a specific CLA. This allows the use of the weighted 
impact of the CLA, i.e. the ratio of workers covered by a specific CLA to the total number of 
workers covered by a CLA in that sector. In this way, our analysis differs from a recent research 
performed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment on the employment protection 
provisions in Dutch CLAs (cf. SZW, 2004). In their analysis, the number of CLAs with a specific 
provision is calculated and it remains unclear how many workers are covered by the provisions.  
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We analysed the CLAs on a number of variables that are of interest to our study: period of notice, 
trial period, the maximum number and duration of temporary contracts and the existence of extra-
statutory unemployment insurance. In addition, we used the online database of Statistics 
Netherlands (Statline, 2007) to retrieve sector level information on hiring and firing rates, union 
coverage, negotiated and actual wage development, the number of flexible contracts, labour costs 
and the share of unemployment contribution and severance payment in those labour costs. This 
allows us to test the hypotheses on the labour market effects of employment protection.  
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4 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION IN DUTCH CLAS 
 
4.1 EMPLOYER’S PERIOD OF NOTICE 
 
An employer who wants to dismiss a worker on a regular contract has to observe a period of 
notice.2 With respect to this period of notice, national law (Civil Code Book article 672) states that: 
 
•  Notice is given at the end of the month, unless differently arranged in a written agreement;  
•  The employer’s period of notice is 1 month for contracts shorter than 5 years; 2 months for 
contracts in between 5 and 10 years; 3 months for contracts in between 10 and 15 years; and 4 
months for contracts longer than 15 years; 
•  Only if permission is granted by the authorised public body (currently the Centre for Work and 
Income, CWI) to dismiss an employee, the employer’s period of notice can be shortened with 1 
month, provided that a minimum of 1 month remains; 
•  The employer’s period of notice as mentioned before can be shortened or extended in collective 
labour agreements or other agreement arranged by a competent governing body. However, the 
employer’s period of notice cannot be shorter than that of the worker.  
 
This shows that the employer’s period of notice can be shortened or extended by CLAs. The fact 
that CLAs can contain ‘worse provisions’ for the worker, is rarely observed in countries where 
national law on employment protection exists. For example, in Germany, CLAs can only provide 
‘better provisions’ for workers. Table 4.1 shows that for about 75 percent of the workers covered 
by a CLA (CLA workers) the national provisions apply. Only for contracts longer than 15 years, this 
percentage is lower, about 69 percent. For 20 percent of the CLA workers the employer’s period of 
notice is higher than the national period of notice, i.e. these workers enjoy a higher level of 
protection, ceteris paribus. Of workers with longer running contracts, 14 to 32 percent enjoys a 
lower level of protection, compared to national law, as is also reflected in the average period of 
notice. For labour contracts longer than 5 years it is shorter than the national one, with the 
difference increasing with the duration of the contact, i.e. ranging from 0.05 months shorter for 
contracts between 5 and 10 years to 0.5 months shorter for contracts longer than 15 years. 
 
Table 4.1: Employer’s period of notice observed in Dutch CLAs (% of CLA workers) 
  Duration of contract 
  < 5 years  5 – 10 years  10 – 15 years  > 15 years 
Employers’ period of notice observed in  CLAs:         
- according to national law  76.07  77.93  76.85  68.64 
- shorter than national law  3.73  14.1  22.93  31.19 
- longer than national law  20.2  7.97  0.22  0.17 
        
Period of notice according to national law  1  2  3  4 
Estimated average period of notice  1.247  1.947  2.747  3.494 
Source: FNV CLA databank (2006). 
                                                  
2 Note that a period of notice is only applicable if the employer follows the public route for dismissal (about 50 percent of the 
dismissal cases). In case the court route is followed, a severance pay applies rather than a period of notice. See Schils (2007), 
among others, for an overview of the Dutch dismissal system.  
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For about 8 percent of the CLA workers the old regulation on the period of notice applies. In 1999, 
national law on the period of notice, among other things, changed. The old rule provided a period of 
notice in weeks equal to the number of years that the worker had been employed, with a maximum 
of 13 weeks (no minimum). The new legislation is more protective than the old one, however, two 
remarks have to be made. First, for just over half of the workers covered by a CLA with the old 
rule (53 percent), a minimum period of notice of one month applies, similar to the new legislation. 
Second, for older workers in many cases a different period of notice applies.   
 
For about 22 percent of the CLA workers, a fixed period of notice applies regardless of the 
duration of the contract, varying from one to three months as shown in Table 4.2. The table also 
shows that, in CLAs with a fixed period of notice, higher level workers have a slightly, yet not 
significant, longer period of notice than lower level workers. Another important lesson that can be 
learned from the information presented in this table is that correcting for the number of workers 
covered by a specific CLA is necessary. When only looking at the share of CLAs in which a certain 
period of notice is observed, one would mistakenly conclude that higher level workers have a 
significantly longer period of notice compared to lower level workers.  
 
Table 4.2: Period of notice in CLAs with fixed period of notice.  
  Lower level workers  Higher level workers 
  % of CLAs  % of CLA workers  % of CLAs  % of CLA workers 
Fixed period of notice 
 • 1 month 
 • 2 months 

















Period of notice depending on contract 
duration  
86.76 78.82 85.77 78.39 
Source: FNV CLA databank (2006). 
 
Next, we analysed sector differences in the negotiated period of notice, shown in Table 4.3. For 
contracts shorter than 5 years, the observed difference is largest for workers in education and 
construction, where for less than half of the CLA workers the national period of notice applies. The 
observed difference is smallest for workers in trade and transport, where the national provisions 
apply to 95 percent of the CLA workers. In most cases, the observed period of notice is longer than 
the national one, with the highest estimated average period of notice found in education. The 
shortest notice periods are found in trade, transport or commercial services. For contracts with a 
duration between 5 and 10 years, the observed difference is largest for workers in government, 
transport and commercial services where national provisions apply to about 60 percent of the CLA 
workers.  The average period of notice is significantly shorter than the national one for workers in 
industry, construction, trade, transport and commercial services, while it is significantly longer for 
workers in education and government.   
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Table 4.3: Observed period of notice in CLAs and compliance with national law, by sector (% of CLA workers) 
  Contracts shorter than 5 years  Contracts between  5 and 10 years 
  shorter  national  longer  est. avg.    shorter  national  longer  est. avg.   
Agriculture 0.46  74.54  25.00  1.249    0.46  99.54  0  1.996   
Industry  1.86 89.92 8.22 1.093    9.76 87.85 2.39 1.926   
Construction  12.66 49.06 38.29 1.316    12.66 87.34  0  1.894  
Trade 0  98.06  1.94  1.019    17.33  82.67  0  1.852   
Transport  0.24 93.71 6.04 1.057    29.23 70.33 0.43 1.711   
Commercial services  15.25  76.92  7.82  0.988    37.89  60.52  1.59  1.662   
Government 0  59.00  41.00  1.739    0  62.33  37.67  2.380   
Education 0  43.90  56.10  2.037    0  97.86  2.14  2.476   
Health care  0  67.53  32.47  1.325    0.22  99.78  0  2.001   
  Contracts between 10 and 15 years  Contracts longer than 15 years 
  shorter  national  longer  est. avg.    shorter  national  longer  est. avg.   
Agriculture 25.46  74.54  0  2.747    25.46  74.54  0  3.495   
Industry 15.11  84.34  0.54  2.842    15.87  84.13  0  3.734   
Construction 50.94  49.06  0  2.532    50.94  49.06  0  3.110   
Trade 19.33  80.67  0  2.865    19.34  80.66  0  3.794   
Transport 14.74  85.25  0.01  2.760    35.28  64.72  0  3.408   
Commercial services  42.18  57.39  0.43  2.404    42.55  57.37  0.07  3.085   
Government  0.85 98.85 0.31 2.995    33.76 66.24  0  3.654   
Education 11.18  88.82  0  2.915    54.47  45.53  0  3.371   
Health care  24.65  75.35  0  2.756    24.65  75.35  0  3.511   
Source: FNV CLA databank (2006). 
 
For contracts longer than 10 years, the observed difference is largest for workers in construction 
and commercial services, where national law applies to less than 60 percent of the CLA workers. 
The observed average period of notice is significantly shorter than the national one, except for 
workers in government and education with a contracts between 10 and 15 years. The observed 
difference is smallest for workers in industry and trade with a contract over 10 years or for workers 
in government and education with a contract in between 10 and 15 years, where national law applies 
to over 80 percent of the CLA workers. The shortest period of notice is observed for workers in 
commercial services and the longest period of notice is observed for workers in government and 
education with contracts between 10 and 15 years and for workers in industry and trade with 
contracts longer than 15 years. 
 
4.2 TRIAL PERIOD 
 
A trial period refers to the first months of a contract during which dismissal is possible without a 
period of notice. National labour law states that 
 
•  The trial period for permanent contracts is set at 2 months; 
•  For temporary contracts the trial period is set at 1 month for contracts shorter than 2 years and 
2 months for contracts of 2 years and longer;  
•  Trial periods at the expense of the worker can be arranged in collective labour agreements or 
other agreements arranged by a competent governing body; 
•  Trial periods longer than 2 months are illegal.   
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The allowed variance in CLAs implies that for workers on a temporary contract shorter than 2 
years both a lower level of employment protection (a longer trial period up to 2 months) or a 
higher level of employment protection (a shorter trial period) can be arranged. For workers on a 
permanent contract only a higher level of employment protection can be arranged in CLAs. Our 
research shows almost no variation in the trial period for workers on a permanent contract. Only in 
industry for about 0.2 percent of the CLA workers a trial period of one month applies, regardless of 
the duration of the contract. Variation is only observed for workers on short-term contracts. For 
about 47 percent of the CLA workers a trial period of two months applies, regardless of the 
duration of the contract, implying a lower protection for workers on short-term temporary 
contracts. Figure 4.3 shows that the observed divergence from national law with respect to the 
short-term contracts is lowest for workers in agriculture and health care, with over 80 percent of 
CLA workers covered by the national provisions. The divergence is largest for workers in trade and 
education, where the national trial period only applies to 20 percent of the CLA workers. The figure 
also shows a shorter trial period of zero months or two weeks for short-term contracts, i.e. a 
higher protection level, in education.  
 




































































































Short-term contracts: shorter than national law
short-term contracts: longer than national law
Source: FNV CLA databank (2006). 
 
4.3 THE USE OF TEMPORARY CONTRACTS 
 
The Flexibility and Security Act dating from January, 1999 (Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid) has been 
established to enlarge the possibilities for flexible contracts but at the same time protect the 
workers on such contracts. One of the main regulations within this law concerns the limitation of 
the number and total duration of a sequence of temporary contracts. Crucial here is the interval 
period in between the temporary contracts: only contracts that follow each other within a period of 
three months are counted as sequential contracts. Law states that (Civil Code Book art. 668A): 
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As from the day that between the employer and the worker: 
a.  A series of temporary labour contracts with an interval period of at most 3 months have followed 
each other and exceed, including the interval periods, a total duration of 36 months, the latest 
contract counts as a permanent one; 
b.  More than 3 temporary labour contracts have followed each other with an interval period of at 
most 3 months, the latest contracts counts as a permanent one.  
 
There is no notice period for the termination of temporary contracts (since the end date is specified 
in the contract). A temporary contract can be dissolved before it legally ends, only when this is 
agreed upon in the individual labour contract. When the dissolution is the employer’s initiative, 
however, he still needs a legal permit from the public authority.  
 
The provisions on the interval period in between temporary contracts, the maximum number and 
total duration of temporary contract can be differently arranged in collective labour agreements. 
Our research shows that for 93.4 percent of the CLA workers the national interval period of three 
months applies and for 6.6 percent a shorter interval period is observed. In none of the analysed 
CLAs a longer interval period is observed. Figure 4.4 shows that the divergence from national law 
on this item is only observed for workers in agriculture, trade and health care. In agriculture, hardly 
any CLA complies with the national provisions, for 60 percent of the CLA workers in this sector an 
interval period of one month applies, and for 20 percent an even shorter interval period. The 
protection level is lower, since workers can be re-hired on a temporary contract after a month, 
without it being a sequence of contracts to which the rules of the Law Flexibility and Security apply. 
This is likely to reflect the large fluctuations in labour demand in this sector. In both trade and 
health care, 10 to 15 percent of the CLA workers have a shorter interval period of 1 month.  
 




































































































< 1 month 1 month 3 months (national law)
 
Source: FNV CLA databank (2006). 
 
Figure 4.5 shows that especially for workers in education, but to a lesser extent also those in 
industry, construction, trade and commercial services, a divergence from the national provision on 
the maximum number of temporary contracts is found. When a lower maximum is agreed upon in 
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the CLAs (e.g. in construction, trade, commercial services), a maximum of two temporary contracts 
is most common, yet in a small number of CLAs (e.g. particularly in industry) it states that only one 
temporary contract is allowed, and particularly in special economic circumstances. When a higher 
maximum is agreed upon in CLAs (e.g. mainly in education), there is larger variation, ranging from a 
maximum number of 4 to 12 temporary contracts. 
 




































































































< 3 contracts 3 contracts (national law) > 3 contracts
 
Source: FNV CLA databank (2006). 
 
Finally, divergence from the national provision on the maximum duration of a sequence of 
temporary contracts is found in the same sectors where a divergence from national law was found 
with respect to the maximum number of temporary contracts, e.g. education, industry, construction, 
trade and commercial services (see Figure 4.6). In the latter three sectors mainly a lower maximum 
duration is found, ranging from 6 months to 24 months, whereas in the first two sectors also longer 
durations are found, up to 72 months or even an unlimited total duration for about 4 percent for 
the CLA workers in education.  
 




































































































< 36 months 36 months > 36 months
 
Source: FNV CLA databank (2006). 
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4.4 OVERALL PROTECTION LEVEL BY SECTOR 
 
To compare protection levels between sectors, we use the OECD Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) indicator (OECD, 2004). The OECD developed this indicator originally to compare 
countries, and although criticism has been put forward on this indicator (Deelen et al., 2006), mostly 
on the subjectivity of the coding frame, it is the most common way to compare levels of protection 
at the moment. The index is a weighted average of scores on 18 different aspects of a country’s 
employment protection, such as period of notice, severance payment, procedural delays, reasons for 
dismissal, the use of temporary and fixed-term contracts, the length of trial periods and the rules for 
collective dismissal. Using the evidence on the period of notice, trial period and the use of 
temporary contracts discussed in the previous section, we are able to calculate the index on a 
sector level in the Netherlands. We recognise the fact that deviations from the national index are 
rather small, since only a few input variables vary between the sectors (4 of the 18 items in the 
OECD indicator to be specific), yet we still find this exercise of importance.  
 
Details on the calculation of the sector based indices are presented in the Appendix, but it is worth 
mentioning here that we used a slightly different technique compared to the OECD. The OECD 
index uses rather crude categories for the scores, which is also one of the points of criticism on the 
index (cf. Bertola et al., 2000). For example, part of the coding frame for the employer’s period of 
notice at 9 months tenure is: a score of 1 for a period of notice smaller than 0.4 months, a score of 
2 for a period of notice in between 0.4 and 0.8 months and a score of 3 for a period of notice in 
between 0.8 and 1.2 months. When using the average notice period measured at the sector level, 
and corrected for the fact that about half of the dismissal cases goes by court without a period of 
notice applying, almost all sectors receive a score of 2 (except for government and education where 
the score is 3). It can be argued, however, that in the category between 0.4 and 0.8 months, 
differences exist between the sectors that should be accounted for in the index. We have chosen to 
do so using extrapolation methods.  
 
Figure 4.7 presents the calculated scores representing the level of employment protection for all 
sectors. The first bar is the score when using the national legislation. Although differences are small, 
it can still be observed that in all sectors the sector level provisions lead to a similar or higher level 
of employment protection compared to the national legislative level. For workers in trade, transport 
or industry, the observed differences are zero or smallest and for workers in government, 
construction and education these are largest.  
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Source: OECD (2004), FNV CLA databank (2006). 
 
The fact that the indicator is nowhere lower than the national average might seem surprising at first 
sight, since the CLA research showed some lower protection measures in some sectors. This is 
explained, however, by the items of employment protection that are reflected in the OECD 
indicator. For example, the average period of notice is the measured at a tenure of 9 months and 4 
years, and in the CLAs it was observed that these were higher in most sectors compared to the 
national legislation. This pushes the OECD indicator upwards. The average period of notice for 
longer running contracts was larger in our CLA research, yet only the period of notice at 20 years 
tenure is included in the OECD indicator. In addition, we found that trial periods for workers on 
short-term contracts were higher than the nationally determined ones, indicating lower protection 
levels. However, the trial period for short-term temporary contracts is not included in the OECD 
indicator. Including these items in the indicator could lead to somewhat lower levels of employment 
protection in some or all sectors. The extent to which the levels of the indicator would be lowered, 
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5 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION,  BARGAINING POWER AND LABOUR 
MARKET PERFORMANCE 
 
5.1 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND BARGAINING POWER 
 
The first hypothesis raised in the theoretical part of this paper is that ‘provisions on workers’ 
employment protection are more common/higher in sectors where union density is highest’. As 
Visser (2006) already showed, union density rates in the Netherlands are relatively low with just 
over one-fifth of the labour force population being a union member (22.3%). Union density rates are 
lowest in commercial services and trade (7.3 and 8.0 percent respectively) and highest in the 
construction and government sector (45.3 and 46.8 percent respectively). Figure 5.1 shows the 
relation between these union density rates and the observed level of employment protection. It 
shows that there is a positive correlation between the two, with higher levels of employment 
protection corresponding to higher union density rates (correlation coefficient is 0.60). Although 
such correlation does not show causality, it is still instructive. Two sectors behave differently: in 
industry and transport union density rates are relatively high, yet the level of employment 
protection is relatively low. It might be that the trade unions’ focus in bargaining working conditions 
for the workers in these sectors is not on employment protection but on other conditions.  
 



























Source: Statistics Netherlands (2007). 
 
The second hypothesis raised in the theoretical part is that ‘Extra-statutory unemployment 
insurance is more common/higher in sectors with lower levels of employment protection’. To test 
this, we analysed the CLAs on the provisions of extra-statutory unemployment insurance. In 
contrast to employment protection provisions, with respect to unemployment insurance only 
supplements are allowed in CLAs. Even though national unemployment insurance in the Netherlands 
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is relatively generous, for about 37 percent of the CLA workers supplementary unemployment 
insurance exist. Total unemployment benefits can mount up to 95 percent of previous earnings 
(including state benefits that are 70 to 75 percent of previous earnings). The duration depends on 
the worker’s tenure and is in most cases similar to that of state benefits. In most cases, there is a 
very high supplement (up to 95 percent) in the initial months of unemployment which is then 
lowered when the unemployment duration is longer. Such supplements are most common for 
workers in education and health care, where almost all workers are covered by such provisions (93 
to 100 percent). In contrast, it is least common in agriculture and trade where at most 2 percent of 
the workers are covered by supplementary unemployment insurance. Figure 5.2 shows the relation 
between the level of employment protection and such extra-statutory unemployment insurance. 
Interestingly, rather than the expected substitution between employment protection and 
unemployment insurance on the sector level, we observe a positive relation (correlation coefficient 
is 0.63). The two seem to be complementary. Again, not all sectors fit this profile. Workers in 
government do enjoy, on average, higher employment protection, yet supplementary unemployment 
insurance only exists for about 40 percent of the workers in this sector. For workers in health care, 
the reverse is observed with an average level of employment protection, yet supplementary 
unemployment insurance for about 93 percent of the workers. In addition, the correlation between 
extra-statutory unemployment insurance and union density on the sector level is less strong than 
that between extra-statutory unemployment insurance and the level of employment protection 
(correlation coefficient of 0.44 compared to 0.63). 
 










































































Source: FNV CLA database (2006). 
 
A final hypothesis with respect to collective bargaining is that higher levels of employment 
protection reduce the scope for wage bargaining, i.e. negotiated wages. To test this we used the 
hourly wages by sector (Statistics Netherlands, 2007). Recognising the fact that this might be a crude 
proxy, at the moment we do not have an alternative. Hourly CLA wages are not available, and it is 
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difficult to calculate ‘the average CLA wage’ because there are different wage categories negotiated 
in CLAs. We find that the hourly wages are below the national average for workers in agriculture 
and trade, where workers earn about 75 percent of the average (national) hourly wage. These are 
two sectors where the previously discussed indicators differ. Workers in the trade sector enjoy a 
relatively low level of employment protection, have no extra-statutory unemployment insurance, 
and union density rates are low. In agriculture, union density rates as well as the bargained level of 
employment protection are average, while extra-statutory unemployment insurance is low. In 
addition, hourly wages are highest for workers in, commercial services, government and education. 
The commercial service sector is an outlier in this respect, with low union density, a low level of 
employment protection and no extra-statutory unemployment insurance. Figure 5.3 shows the 
relation between the level of employment protection and the observed hourly wages by sector. 
Rather than the expected negative relation, a positive relation is observed between the level of 
employment protection and hourly wages (correlation coefficient is 0.64). It more likely supports 
the opposite relation put forward in some studies is true that higher levels of employment 
protection increase the room for the insiders to bargain for higher wages (cf. Deelen et al., 2006).  
 























Source: Statistics Netherlands (2007) 
 
5.2 EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION AND LABOUR MARKET PERFORMANCE 
 
Our first hypothesis with respect to the labour market effects of employment protection was that 
‘higher levels of employment protection reduce, ceteris paribus, firing and hiring rates’. For the 
analysis we used data from Statistics Netherlands and to correct for short-term economic 
fluctuation effects we used averages from 2000 to 2005 for all labour market indicators discussed in 
this section. Figure 5.4 shows some evidence on the relation between the level of employment 
protection and hiring and firing rates by sector. As a proxy for hiring rates, we use the inflow into 
AIAS-UvA            25 Trudie Schils       
labour and as a proxy for firing rates we use the outflow rates out of labour into unemployment 
insurance or social assistance, which can be used to reflect the firing rates.  
 

































Inflow into employment: hiring Outflow into unemployment
Source: Statistics Netherlands (2007). 
 
The expected negative relation between the level of employment protection and both hiring and 
firing rates seems to be supported by this evidence (correlation coefficients –0.58 and –0.49 
respectively). Some sectors diverge from this pattern with highest hiring rates in commercial 
services and agriculture, two sectors with average levels of employment protection. Alternatively, 
the sector specific contribution to unemployment insurance can be used as a proxy for the level of 
unemployment by sector. Contributions to unemployment in the Netherlands are partly dependent 
on the sector-level unemployment rates. The resulting correlation between the level of employment 
protection and the sector-specific contribution rates is similar to that with the outflow into 
unemployment (correlation coefficient is -0.44). 
 


































Source: Statistics Netherlands (2007). 
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A second hypothesis raised in the theoretical section was whether ‘higher levels of employment 
protection lead to a larger share of workers on temporary contracts’. Figure 5.5 shows the relation 
between the level of employment protection and the share of workers on a temporary contract by 
sector. Rather than the expected positive relation, there seems to be evidence of a negative relation 
between the level of employment and the share of workers on a temporary contract (correlation 
coefficient is –0.47). This might be due to the fact that the provisions on the use of workers on 
temporary contracts are also changed in a number of CLAs, as discussed before.   
 
The final hypothesis raised in our theoretical section was that ‘higher levels of employment 
protection lead to higher labour costs’. To test this, we looked at non-wage labour costs, in 
particular the costs of sector dependent unemployment contributions plus severance payments. We 
think that in this way we measure the part of labour costs resulting from employment protection 
that have to be internalised by the employer. Figure 5.6 shows the relation between the level of 
employment protection and the share of these non-wage labour costs in the employer’s total labour 
cost. The evidence slightly supports the hypothesis, with higher non-wage labour costs found in 
sectors with higher levels of employment protection (correlation coefficient is 0.44). For example, in 
government the share of labour costs related to employment protection is 5.8 percent, while in 
trade this is just below 2 percent.   
 





























Source: Statistics Netherlands (2007). 
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6 CONCLUSION  
 
In this paper we explored the provisions on employment protection in collective labour agreements. 
Dutch labour law allows variation on the sector level, even at the expense of the worker, resulting 
from collective bargaining between the employers and the trade unions. The evidence, summarised 
in Table 6.1, shows that there is substantial variation between the sectors with respect to 
employment protection provisions. The employer’s period of notice is equal or longer than national 
legislation for short-term contracts (shorter than 5 years) increasing the level of employment 
protection for workers on such contracts. The period of notice is generally equal or shorter than 
national legislation for longer running contracts, lowering the level of employment protection. The 
observed trial periods for permanent contracts are not differently arranged in collective labour 
agreements, noted that only a shorter trial period is allowed. For short-term temporary contracts, 
however, most collective labour agreements provide longer trial periods, lowering the level of 
employment protection for workers on such contracts. Finally, with respect to the use of temporary 
contracts, we found that the interval period in between two temporary contracts in order for them 
to belong to a sequence (with specific law applying to it) is shorter in some sectors, increasing the 
level of employment protection. With respect to the maximum number and duration of a sequence 
of temporary contracts, both higher and lower levels of employment protection are observed in 
some sectors. So even within the sector, on the company level, there is some variation in 
employment protection legislation.   
 
Table 6.1: Summary findings on deviation from national law of sector level employment provisions  
  Employer’s period of notice  Use of temporary contracts 


















Agriculture  +  0  -  -  0 / 0  +  0  0 
Industry  0  0  -  -  0 / -  0  0  - , + 
Construction  +  -  -  -  0 / -  0  +  + 
Trade  0  -  -  -  0 / -  +  - , +  + 
Transport  0  -  -  -  0 / -  0  0  0 
Commercial 
services 
0  -  -  -  0 / -  0  +  + 
Government  +  +  0  -  0 / -  0  0  0 
Education  +  +  0  -  0 / -  0  - , +  - , + 
Health care  +  0  -  -  0 / 0  +  0  0 
- indicates that the level of employment protection is lowered by the observed sector provisions compared to the 
national level; + indicates that the level of employment protection is increased by the observed sector provisions 
compared to the national level; 0 indicates that no deviation from national law is observed. 
 
Next, using these findings, we tested some hypotheses on the relation between employment 
protection legislation and collective bargaining on the one hand and labour market flexibility on the 
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other hand. Table 6.2 summarises our main findings. When looking at the relation with collective 
bargaining first, we do find only minor support for our hypotheses. Higher union density is indeed 
positively related to higher levels of employment protection. Yet we do not find the expected 
negative relation between the level of employment protection and extra-statutory unemployment 
insurance or wages. In fact, for both hypotheses, the reverse is found. Extra-statutory 
unemployment insurance is used as a complement to employment protection, even given the 
relatively generous national level of unemployment insurance. As for the wage effect, the idea that 
well protected insiders have more room to bargain for higher wages seems to be supported by our 
sector level analysis.  
 
Table 6.2: Summary findings on the hypotheses tested in this paper 
Hypotheses on employment protection and collective bargaining: 
1  Positive relation between union density and level of employment protection Support  found   
2  Negative relation between level of employment protection and extra-statutory  
unemployment insurance  Reverse found 
3  Negative relation between level of employment protection and hourly wages  Reverse found 
Hypotheses on employment protection and labour market flexibility 
4  Negative relation between level of employment protection and hiring/firing rates  Support found 
5  Positive relation between level of employment protection and use of temporary work  Reverse found 
6  Positive relation between level of employment protection and employer’s labour costs  Support found 
 
In addition, when looking at the relation with labour market flexibility, we find some support for our 
hypotheses. Higher levels of employment protection so seem to be related to lower hiring and firing 
rates, i.e. with lower levels of labour market mobility. In addition, the higher levels of employment 
protection are also related to higher levels of non-wage labour costs for the employer, though the 
correlation is not as strong as with the hiring and firing rates. Finally, we do not find support for the 
hypothesis that higher levels of employment protection lead to an increased share of workers on 
temporary contract, in fact the reverse is supported by our data.  
 
These results contribute to the literature, especially since most of the relations were not shown on 
the sector level before. The fact that higher levels of employment protection are found on the 
sector level is a little bit surprising given the (current) public debate on the reform of the Dutch 
system of employment protection. This debate fully focuses on the national legislation and 
employers and trade unions cannot agree on how to change this. Employers oppose against the 
system, stating that it is too restrictive, while on the other hand, they agree with even stricter 
provisions on the sector level. When no outcome is found on the national level, future collective 
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APPENDIX: CALCULATION OF SECTOR LEVEL EPL INDICES 
 
We do not replicate the full calculation method of the OECD indicator in this section, we only pay 
attention to the four items that are found to vary between the sectors: period of notice, trial 
period, maximum number of temporary contracts and maximum total duration of a series of 
temporary contracts. For example, the OECD uses the following coding frames for the employer’s 
notice period (only relevant parts shown here):  
At 9 months tenure:  Notice period < 0.4 months = 1 
Notice period < 0.8 months = 2 
  At 4 years tenure:  Notice period <  0.75 months = 1 
Notice period < 1.25 months = 2 
At 20 years tenure  Notice period < 1 months = 0 
Notice period < 2.75 months = 1 
The OECD corrects for the fact that only half of the cases go via the public dismissal route and 
hence the national score is calculated as follows. At 9 months the notice period is 1 month, 
summarised by a factor 0.5 for the mentioned correction yields an average notice period of 0.5 and 
a corresponding score of 2. Repeating this for the notice period at 4 and 20 years tenure, the total 
score sums to 4 using national legislation (Table A1). When using linear extrapolation, the total 
score using national legislation is much lower, 2.202. To calculate the sector level scores, we used 
the average notice period based on the CLA-provisions, and again the method of linear 
extrapolation is used. The scores for the three other items are acquired in a similar way, whereby 
the OECD coding frames are as follows: 
  Trial period:   > 2.5 = 4 
   >  1.5  =  5 
< 1.5 = 6 
  Maximum number of temporary contracts:  > 4 = 2 
> 3 = 3 
       >   2   =   4  
  Maximum duration of sequence of temporary contracts: no limit = 0 
                     > 36 months = 1 
          >  30  months  =  2 
Table A1 shows the sector averages used and the scores per item. The overall score is a weighted 
total of the 18 items in the OECD indicator and we followed the OECD weighting scheme (see 
OECD (2004) for details. The version I indicator is without the provisions for collective dismissal 
and the version II indicator is including those provisions.   
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Table A1: Input for sector based employment protection indicator 
  National  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9] 
Employer’s notice period  
At  9  months  1  1.25 1.09 1.32 1.02 1.06 0.99 1.74 2.04 1.33 
At  4  years  1  1.25 1.12 1.37 1.02 1.06 1.09 1.79 2.04 1.33 
at  20  years  3  2.5  2.79 2.11 2.79 3.01 2.09 2.64 2.37 2.51 
score  regular  4  4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 4 
score  extrapolated 2.202  2.539 2.335 2.595 2.181 2.32  1.99  3.551 4.015 2.695 
             
Trial period for workers on permanent contract 
Average  2  1.59 1.71 1.68 1.89 1.71 1.67 1.35 1.18 1.6 
score  regular  5  5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 
score  extrapolated  4.5  4.91 4.79 4.82 4.61 4.79 4.83 5.1  5.21 4.9 
             
Maximum number of temporary contracts in a sequence 
Average  3  2.99 3.03 2.9  3  3.02 3.07 2.95 3.07 3 
score  regular  3  3 3 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 
score  extrapolated  3  3.01 2.97 3.1  3  2.98 2.93 3.05 2.93 3 
             
Maximum total duration of sequence of temporary contracts 
Average  36  36 39 34 36 36 34 36 38 36 
score  regular  1  1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 
score  extrapolated  1  1 1 1.33  1 1 1.33  1 1 1 
             
Version I indicator 
score  regular  2.182  2.182 2.182 2.287 2.182 2.182 2.245 2.334 2.272 2.182 
score  exttrapolated 2.119  2.144 2.132 2.168 2.123 2.132 2.143 2.179 2.187 2.147 
             
Version II indicator 
score  regular  2.319  2.319 2.319 2.406 2.319 2.319 2.37  2.445 2.393 2.319 
score  extrapolated 2.266  2.287 2.277 2.307 2.269 2.277 2.286 2.316 2.322 2.289 
[1] = Agriculture, [2] = Industry, [3] = Construction, [4] = Trade, [5] = Transport, [6] = Commercial services, [7] 
= Government, [8] = Education, [9] = Health care. 
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04-28   “The Work-Family Balance in Collective agreements. More Female employees, More Provisions?”  
 July  2004   
  Killian Schreuder  
04-27   “Female Income, the Ego Effect and the Divorce Decision: Evidence from Micro Data”  
  March 2004  
  Randy Kesselring (Professor of Economics at Arkansas State University , USA) was quest at AIAS in 
April and May 2003  
04-26   “Economische effecten van Immigratie – Ontwikkeling van een Databestand en eerste analyses  
  Januari 2004  
  Joop Hartog (FEE) & Aslan Zorlu  
03-25   ”Wage Indicator” – Dataset Loonwijzer 
  Januari 2004 dr Kea Tijdens 
03-24  “Codeboek DUCADAM Dataset” 
  December 2003 Drs Kilian Schreuder & dr Kea Tijdens 
03-23  “Household Consumption and Savings Around the Time of Births and the Role of Education” 
  December 2003 Adriaan S. Kalwij 
03-22  “A panel data analysis of the effects of wages, standard hours and unionisation on paid overtime work 
in Britain” 
  October 2003 Adriaan S. Kalwij 
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03-21  “A Two-Step First-Difference Estimator for a Panel Data Tobit Model” 
  December 2003 Adriaan S. Kalwij 
03-20  “Individuals’ Unemployment Durations over the Business Cycle” 
  June 2003 dr Adriaan Kalwei 
03-19  Een onderzoek naar CAO-afspraken op basis van de FNV cao-databank en de AWVN-database” 
December 2003 dr Kea Tijdens & Maarten van Klaveren 
03-18  “Permanent and Transitory Wage Inequality of British Men, 1975-2001: Year, Age and Cohort 
Effects” 
  October 2003 dr Adriaan S. Kalwij & Rob Alessie 
03-17  “Working Women’s Choices for Domestic Help” 
  October 2003 dr Kea Tijdens, Tanja van der Lippe & Esther de Ruijter 
03-16  “De invloed van de Wet arbeid en zorg op verlofregelingen in CAO’s” 
  October 2003 Marieke van Essen 
03-15  “Flexibility and Social Protection” 
  August 2003 dr Ton Wilthagen 
03-14  “Top Incomes in the Netherlands and The United Kingdom over the Twentieth Century”September 
2003 Sir dr A.B.Atkinson and dr. W. Salverda 
03-13  “Tax Evasion in Albania: an Institutional Vacuum”  
April 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani 
03-12 “Politico-Economic  Institutions  and the Informal Sector in Albania” 
May 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani 
03-11  “Tax Evasion and the Source of Income: An experimental study in Albania and the Netherlands”  
May 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani   
03-10  "Chances and limitations of "benchmarking" in the reform of welfare state structures - the case of 
pension policy”  
May 2003 dr Martin Schludi 
03-09  "Dealing with the "flexibility-security-nexus: Institutions, strategies, opportunities and barriers”  
May 2003 prof. Ton Wilthagen en dr. Frank Tros 
03-08  “Tax Evasion in Transition: Outcome of an Institutional Clash -Testing Feige’s Conjecture"  
March 2003 dr Klarita Gërxhani 
03-07  “Teleworking Policies of Organisations- The Dutch Experiencee” 
February 2003 dr Kea Tijdens en Maarten van Klaveren 
03-06  “Flexible Work- Arrangements and the Quality of Life” 
February 2003 drs Cees Nierop 
01-05  Employer’s and employees’ preferences for working time reduction and working time differentiation 
– A study of the 36 hours working week in the Dutch banking industry” 
2001 dr Kea Tijdens 
01-04  “Pattern Persistence in Europan Trade Union Density”   
October 2001 prof. dr Danielle Checchi, prof. dr Jelle Visser 
01-03  “Negotiated flexibility in working time and labour market transitions – The case of the Netherlands”  
2001 prof. dr Jelle Visser 
01-02  “Substitution or Segregation: Explaining the Gender Composition in Dutch Manufacturing Industry 
1899 – 1998”    
June 2001 Maarten van Klaveren – STZ Advies en Onderzoek , Eindhoven, dr Kea Tijdens 
00-01  “The first part-time economy in the world. Does it work?”   
June 2000 prof. dr Jelle Visser 
 
 
RESEARCH REPORTS  
02-17  “Industrial Relations in the Transport Sector in the Netherlands” 
  December 2002 dr Marc van der Meer & drs Hester Benedictus 
03-16  "Public Sector Industrial Relations in the Netherlands: framework, principles, players and 
Representativity”  
January 2003 drs Chris Moll, dr Marc van der Meer & prof.dr Jelle Visser 
02-15  “Employees' Preferences for more or fewer Working Hours: The Effects of Usual, Contractual and 
Standard Working Time, Family Phase and Household Characteristics and Job Satisfaction”    
December 2002 dr Kea Tijdens 
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02-13  “Ethnic and Gender Wage Differentials – An exploration of LOONWIJZERS 2001/2002” 
  October 2002 dr Aslan Zorlu 
02-12  “Emancipatie-effectrapportage belastingen en premies – een verkenning naar nieuwe mogelijkheden 
vanuit het belastingstelsel 2001”    
August 2002 dr Kea Tijdens, dr Hettie A. Pott-Buter 
02-11  “Competenties van Werknemers in de Informatiemaatschappij – Een survey over   ICT-gebruik”  
June 2002 dr Kea Tijdens & Bram Steijn 
02-10  “Loonwijzers 2001/2002. Werk, lonen en beroepen van mannen en vrouwen in Nederland” 
 June  2002 Kea Tijdens, Anna Dragstra, Dirk Dragstra, Maarten van Klaveren, Paulien Osse, 
  Cecile Wetzels, Aslan Zorlu 
01-09  “Beloningsvergelijking tussen markt en publieke sector: methodische kantekeningen”   
  November 2001 Wiemer Salverda, Cees Nierop en Peter Mühlau 
01-08  “Werken in de Digitale Delta. Een vragenbank voor ICT-gebruik in organisaties”   
  June 2001 dr Kea Tijdens 
01-07  “De vrouwenloonwijzer. Werk, lonen en beroepen van vrouwen.”    
  June 2001 dr Kea Tijdens 
00-06  “Wie kan en wie wil telewerken?” Een onderzoek naar de factoren die de mogelijkheid tot en de 
behoefte aan telewerken van werknemers beïnvloeden.” 
November 2000 dr Kea Tijdens, dr Cecile Wetzels en Maarten van Klaveren 
00-05  “Flexibele regels: Een onderzoek naar de relatie tussen CAO-afspraken en het bedrijfsbeleid over 
flexibilisering van de arbeid.”    
Juni 2000 dr Kea Tijdens & dr Marc van der Meer 
00-04  “Vraag en aanbod van huishoudelijke diensten in Nederland”   
 June  2000 dr Kea Tijdens 
00-03  “Keuzemogelijkheden in CAO’s”   
 June  2000 Caroline van den Brekel en Kea Tijdens 
00-02  “The toelating van vluchtelingen in Nederland en hun integratie op de arbeidsmarkt.” 
  Juni 2000 Marloes Mattheijer 
00-01  “The trade-off between competitiveness and employment in collective bargaining: the national 
consultation process and four cases of enterprise bargaining in the Netherlands”  
Juni 2000 Marc van der Meer (ed), Adriaan van Liempt, Kea Tijdens, Martijn van Velzen, Jelle Visser. 




AIAS is a young interdisciplinary institute, established in 1998, aiming to become the leading expert centre in 
the Netherlands for research on industrial relations, organisation of work, wage formation and labour market 
inequalities.  
  
As a network organisation, AIAS brings together high-level expertise at the University of Amsterdam from five 
disciplines: 
•  Law 
•  Economics 
•  Sociology 
•  Psychology 
•  Health and safety studies 
 
AIAS provides both teaching and research. On the teaching side it offers a Masters in Advanced Labour 
Studies/Human Resources and special courses in co-operation with other organizations such as the National 
Trade Union Museum and the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. The teaching is in 
Dutch but AIAS is currently developing a MPhil in Organisation and Management Studies and a European 
Scientific Master programme in Labour Studies in co-operation with sister institutes from other countries.  
  
AIAS has an extensive research program (2000-2004) building on the research performed by its member 
scholars. Current research themes effectively include: 
•  The impact of the Euro on wage formation, social policy and industrial relations 
•  Transitional labour markets and the flexibility and security trade-off in social and labour market 
regulation 
•  The prospects and policies of 'overcoming marginalisation' in employment 
•  The cycles of policy learning and mimicking in labour market reforms in Europe 
•  Female agency and collective bargaining outcomes 
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